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Abstract –Eco-evolutionary game dynamics which characterizes the mutual interactions and the
coupled evolutions of strategies and environments has been of growing interests in very recent years.
Since such feedback loops widely exist in a range of coevolutionary systems, such as microbial systems,
social-ecological system and psychologicaleconomic system, recent modeling frameworks that unveil
the oscillating dynamics of social dilemmas have great potential for practical applications. In this
perspective article, we overview the latest progress of evolutionary game theory in this direction. We
describe both mathematical methods and interdisciplinary applications across different fields. The
ideas worthy of further consideration are discussed in prospects, with the central role of promoting
cooperations in a changing world.
Introduction. – Cooperation is the cornerstone of hu-
man civilization and is important for the efficient and stable
development of economy and society [1, 2]. However, the
“selfish gene” is widespread in all levels of complex life sys-
tems which often drives the emergence of social dilemmas
in the context of natural selections [3–5]. Therefore, es-
tablishing persistent cooperations has always been the cen-
tral quest of evolutionary game theory [6–8]. For example,
many different mechanisms were proposed to deal with the
well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma in two-player games, such
as incorporating the spatial structure, the complex network
topology, punishment and award, direct reciprocity, indirect
reciprocity and etc [9–13]. Furthermore, a large amount of
works address the “tragedy of the commons” arising in pub-
lic goods game with well-mixed population, which greatly
promotes the understanding of sustaining group coopera-
tions in the real world [14–25].
While early studies mainly focus on the evolutionary prop-
erties of replicator dynamics, the intrinsic evolution pro-
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cess of the ecological environment is paid little attention
[26–28]. Therefore, the eco-evolutionary games that take
into consideration the influence of time-dependent environ-
mental changes have attracted great attention in recent
years [29–33]. Since this paper is surely unable to cover
everything, we suggest a mini-review of such coevolutionary
models [34].
Recently, a novel theoretical framework that further de-
scribes the complex interactions between strategies and the
environment is proposed [35–38]. The core idea is to study
the effect of strategy-dependent environmental feedbacks to-
wards resolving social dilemmas, which is based on the fact
that the cooperation behavior has a non-negligible power
on reshaping the environment while in contrary the envi-
ronment change also impacts individual decisions of cooper-
ation. This framework successfully explains the oscillating
dynamics of both population cooperations and environmen-
tal states.
In this perspective article, we aim to provide an overview
of this newly outlined strategy-dependent feedback-evolving
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both from the views of modeling methods and the real-world
applications. And finally we will provide an explicit prospect
for future studies, including a highlighted open problem of
controlling the co-evolutions which could help defeat a series
of social dilemmas [38].
Modeling frameworks. – Feedback-evolving dynamics
in two-player games.
A unified approach to understand the feedback-evolving
games in which the strategies and the environment coevolve
is proposed by Weitz et al. in [35]. We begin from the
introduction of a generalized environment-dependent payoff
structure in two-player games:












where 0 ≤ n ≤ 1 denotes the current state of the environ-
ment. A0 and A1 represent the payoff matrices that have a
unique Nash equilibrium corresponding to mutual coopera-
tion and mutual defection, respectively. Therefore, R0 > T0
and S0 > P0 while R1 < T1 and S1 < P1. Intuitively,
when n = 0, i.e., the environment is depleted, incentives are
offered to encourage cooperation behaviors so that the re-
sources can be restored. On the other hand, when n = 1, i.e.,
the environment is replete, the payoffs favor unilateral de-
fection, which accounts for the overuse or overexploitation
of a resource. This environment-dependent payoff matrix
can be further written as
A(n) =
[
R0 − (R0 −R1)n S0 − (S0 − S1)n
T0 − (T0 − T1)n P0 − (P0 − P1)n
]
(2)
Thus, the fitnesses of player 1 and player 2, denoted as r1
and r2, can be calculated as
r1(x,A(n)) = x(R0 − (R0 −R1)n)
+ (1− x)(S0 − (S0 − S1)n)
r2(x,A(n)) = x(T0 − (T0 − T1)n)
+ (1− x)(P0 − (P0 − P1)n)
(3)
Finally, the replicator dynamics of this coupled evolutionary
system are described as follows{
x˙ = x(1− x) [r1(x,A(n))− r2(x,A(n))]
n˙ = n(1− n)f(x) (4)
where  represents the relative speed that individual actions
reshape the environment. The logistic term n(1−n) guaran-
tees that the environment state is confined to [0, 1]. The sign
of feedback function f(x) determines the evolution direction
of n, either decreases towards environmental degradation or
increases towards environmental enhancement when f < 0
or f > 0, respectively. In [35], the environment state is
assumed to be modified by the population actions of coop-
eration and a simple linear feedback mechanism is adopted:
f(x) = θx− (1− x) (5)
where θ > 0 indicates the strength of cooperators in enhanc-
ing the environment. See the complete modeling schematic
in fig. 1.
Fig. 1: Schematic of evolutionary game theory with environmen-
tal feedback. The replicator dynamics determines cooperation
behaviors, which reshapes the ecological environment in two-
player games (via environment factor n) [35, 36] or the resource
allocation in public goods game (via multiplication factor rc)
[37,38]. In turn, the strategy-dependent environmental feedbacks
influences the payoff structures of cooperators and defectors and
further drives the oscillation of social dilemma. The timescale
 is a nontrivial parameter that describes the relative speed of
environmental feedbacks.
Under this framework, Weitz et al. show the emergence of
persistent oscillating loops in a special case where the pay-
off matrices A0 and A1 have an embedded symmetry. The
orientation of orbits in x − n phase plane is always coun-
terclockwise, which in intuitive sense can be explained as
four phases that the system evolution experiences: begin-
ning from a depleted environment with few cooperators, to
motivated cooperation, to a restored environment, to invad-
ing defection, and finally going back to the depleted environ-
mental state. Further, they extend the analysis to asymmet-
ric payoffs conditions and find that the fast-slow (0 <  1)
dynamics can converge both to a heteroclinic cycle and to a
fixed point. The former is called “oscillating tragedy of the




R0 − T0 (6)
It is also worth noting that the qualitative outcome of
coupled systems in [35] is independent of the relative feed-
back speed . However, in contrary, Tilman et al. proposed
a more general framework of eco-evolutionary games and
found that the dynamical behaviors actually largely depend
on the relative timescale [36]. Three different environmental
dynamics are incorporated in their work: intrinsic resource
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growth, intrinsic resource decay, or environmental tipping
points. Generally, this eco-evolutionary system is written as{
x˙ = 3x(1− x) [pi1(x, n)− pi2(x, n)]
n˙ = 1f(n) + 2h(x, n)
(7)
where 1, 2 and 3 represents the timescales of intrinsic
dynamics of the environment, the timescale of the environ-
mental impact of the current population strategies and the
timescale of strategy evolution, respectively. In particular,
f(n) governs the intrinsic dynamics of the environmental
factor n while h(x, n) aggregates the influence of population
cooperation behaviors on environmental changes. And pi1
and pi2 are the fitnesses of cooperation and defection, respec-
tively. Accordingly, a renewable resource can be described
as
n˙ = (r − q(eLn+ eH(1− n)))(x− n) (8)
where  is the unified relative timescale, r is the intrinsic
resource-renewing rate. eL and eH are the resource harvest
effort of low- and high-effort strategies, respectively. And
q maps harvesting efforts into the rate of resource reduc-
tion. See [36] for detailed derivation. Similarly, a decaying
resource can be calculated as
n˙ = α(x− n) (9)
here α is the decay rate of the resource. Finally, the envi-
ronment feedback described in [35] can be considered as a
special case caused by a single environmental tipping point
without any intrinsic environmental dynamics. Based on
this framework, Tilman et al. show that all the abundant
physical phenomena arose from the feedback-evolving sys-
tem can be interpreted by the incentives for individual be-
havioral changes and the relative timescale of environmental
versus strategic changes.
The modeling extensions that takes into consideration the
effects of spatially structured interactions or the environ-
mental heterogeneity can be further obtained in [39] and
[40], respectively.
Coevolutionary dynamics in public goods game.
It has been experimentally proven that eco-evolutionary
feedback loops widely exist in microbial systems where co-
operations often arise due to the secretion or the release of
public goods [41–44]. In specific, cooperators are naturally
given preferential access to these common goods, which leads
to the asymmetrical payoff-dependent feedback that drives
the coevolution of ecological properties and the strategies.
Likewise, such group cooperation can also be obtained in
many psychologicaleconomic systems where coevolutionary
dynamics is engineered by the asymmetrical environmental
feedback. One typical example is the crowdsourcing that
aims at completing a project by soliciting contributions from
a number of individuals or online communities, in which the
focal organizer leads the game and often encourages cooper-
ation via providing a higher payoff structure for cooperators,
e.g. promising a higher multiplication factor. While previ-
ous works exclusively focus on two-player games, in [37], we
propose an extended model where individual strategies co-
evolve with the multiplication factors in public goods game
(PGG) to study the emergence of group cooperation in co-
evolutionary dynamics (fig. 1). The replicator equation for
the fraction of cooperators x is










where the focal individual randomly chooses s other partic-
ipants in a well-mixed infinitely population to join the PGG
and Pc, Pd are the expected payoffs of cooperators and defec-
tors. In classic PGG, the cooperators first pay c cost to the
common pool, then the total contribution will be amplified
by a multiplication factor r and finally equally distributes
to every player. For simplicity and without loss of general-
ity, in [37] we set the initial contribution of each cooperator
be 1, i.e., c = 1. In addition, to mimic the asymmetrical
feedback-evolving characters, we assume the multiplication
factor of defectors rd is invariant while the multiplication
factor of cooperators rc co-evolves in response to the global
payoffs distributions, which is described as
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)f(x, rc) (11)
here we confine rc in [α, β] and 1 < α < β < s+ 1 according
to the social dilemma in PGG.  is the relative feedback
speed of rc versus x. Moreover, to describe the fact that
in crowdsourcing project the authoritative organizer may
decide the global incentives distributions for cooperators and
defectors in oder to facilitate the collaboration, we define the
feedback mechanism f(x, rc) as a linear function of global
payoffs of cooperators (xPc) and defectors ((1 − x)Pd) and
take into consideration the limitation of total rewards for
the project:
f(x, rc) = −xPc + θ(1− x)Pd (12)
where θ > 0 is the distribution ratio of cooperator’s and de-
fector’s total payoff expectations. Under this circumstance,
cooperators are favored through increasing rc when x is
small, whereas the continuous consumption of resources re-
sults in the decrease of cooperator’s rewards, which is also
in line with the law of diminishing marginal utility in eco-
nomics. The final ODEs for our model can thus be written
as
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We highlight our main finding that the coevolutionary dy-
namics with asymmetrical environmental feedback can give
rise to oscillating convergence to persistent group coopera-
tion, but only if the feedback updates quickly and promptly
enough compared to the strategy change. Mathematically,





θrds+ (s+ 1)(θ + 1)
θs+ θ + 1
(14)
is stable only when the relative feedback speed of coopera-
tors multiplication factor exceeds a threshold, i.e.,  > ∗,
where ∗ depends on s, rd and θ:
∗ =
(1− x∗)s(r∗c − rd)
(sx∗ + 1)(r∗c − α)(β − r∗c )
(15)
Our work sheds lights on how to successfully organize and
sustain a desired group collaboration, which provides useful
insights into avoiding the traps of social dilemma in many
real scenarios such as knowledge discovery and management,
crisis mapping, crowdfunding, scientific cooperation and etc.
Following the similar idea, a further exploration of co-
evolutionary dynamics with asymmetrical feedback mecha-
nism in spatial threshold PGG is performed in [45], where
simulations are conducted on both square lattice and scale-
free networks. The evolutionary dynamics of a nonlinear
PGG, which incorporates discounted or synergistically en-
hanced value of accumulated cooperative benefits [46], with
different types of ecological variations is also studied in [47].
Note that the environmental feedbacks in [47] are all time-
dependent, not strategy- or payoff-dependent.
An open problem: controlling eco-evolutionary games with
external feedback laws.
While great efforts have been made to reveal the rich dy-
namical outcomes of eco-evolutionary games as well as the
detailed conditions for breaking the “tragedy of the com-
mons”, a fundamental theoretical gap in how to effectively
steer such coevolutionary dynamics to a desired population
state with external control laws remain unsolved. In [38],
we develop a novel and bold manifold control method based
on a generalized framework of coevolutionary multi-player
games with asymmetrical feedback driven by a nonlinear se-
lection gradient [48, 49]. The general form of our feedback
control laws f(x, rc) is given by
f(x, rc) =Φ0(x, rc)(Φ1(x, rc)− a1)
∗ (Φ2(x, rc)− a2)...(an − Φn(x, rc)),
(16)
in which {
Φ0(x, rc) = Pc − Pd
Φi(x, rc) = θiPc − Pd
(17)
and ai ≥ 0, θi > 0, n + 1 denotes the order of the control
law. Here Φ0(x, rc) = Pc − Pd is a simplest form of linear
selection gradient. Hence Eq. 16 represents a sequence of
control functions driven by nonlinear selection gradient in
a general polynomial form. When n = 1, we reach to the
simplest situation where f is a quadratic function and the
eco-evolutionary model reads{
x˙ = x(1− x) (Pc − Pd)
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)(Pc − Pd)(a1 − (θ1Pc − Pd))
(18)
Surprisingly, we find the emergence of multiple segments
of stable and unstable equilibrium manifolds in phase graphs
with different feedback control functions, which naturally
extends the concept of population equilibrium points in pre-
vious models to a manifold (i.e. curve) of stable equilibria.
In particular, our result of unstable equilibrium manifold
circumstance is consistent with the separatrix phenomenon
obtained by experimental study in [44]. In addition, we find
that a larger relative feedback speed () can not only acceler-
ate the convergence process, but also increase the attraction
basin of the stable manifolds.
Based on this framework, we further prove the existence
of external switching control laws, either time-dependent or
state-dependent, for steering the eco-evolutionary dynamics
to any desired region when given an initial population state.
For a clear understanding, two detailed control examples are
provided in fig. 2. In the first case (fig. 2(a)(b) and (e)),
the controlled evolution path is the blue trajectory followed
by the red one. Beginning from (x0, r0) = (0.2, 1.6), the
trajectory first converges to the stable equilibrium manifold
with control law 1f1. We then change the external control
law to 2f2 so that the equilibrium manifold becomes un-
stable. Finally, a small disturbance is applied and the tra-
jectory will automatically evolve to the final desired state
(x0, r0) = (1, 2.5). Similar steering process is performed on
the second case (fig. 2(a)(c)(d) and (e)), where the evolu-
tion path consists of three segments: the blue, green and
pink trajectories. See more details in [38].
According to the experiments in [42], rc in our model
can be modulated by changing the histidine concentration
in the growth medium, which can manipulate the relative
growth rate of the cooperators compared to the defectors.
Therefore, our framework can be applied to many microbial
experiments, which is of great significance in systems biology
and microbial ecology.
Applications. – With the ubiquity of cooperation-
environment co-evolutions in natural systems on different
scales, coevolutionary games dynamics has important and
wide-ranged applications in interdisciplinary fields. Here we
just take a glimpse at the significant potential of this ODEs
framework towards understanding a series of widely con-
cerned problems:
(i) Overexploitation of renewable resources. In [50], a
feedback-evolving game within which the renewable resource
dynamics also depends on the population strategies is pro-
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Fig. 2: Manifold control on eco-evolutionary game dynamics with external switching control laws. Two detailed examples are
presented according to [38]. We begin from (x0, r0) = (0.2, 1.6) and give two desired final state: (x1, r1) = (1, 2.5) and (0.5, 2).
(a)(b) Manifold controlling process for the first example. (a)(c)(d) Manifold controlling process for the second example. The stable
and unstable parts of the equilibrium curves are indicated by solid and dashed black lines, respectively. The external control curves
Φi(x, rc) = 0 are presented by dashed orange lines. Finally, the piecewise controlled trajectories highlighted by blue, red, green and
pink lines are provided in x− rc phase planes. Taken together, the complete control paths and the corresponding control functions
are shown in (e). Parameters: α = 1.5, β = 3.5, S = 3, rd = 1.5.
posed to stress the feasibility of maintaining a healthy shape
of common-pool resources. The analytical and numerical ev-
idences reveal that before taking control measures such as
punishment to solve the overexploitation problem, we should
first pay attention to intrinsic growing capacity of the re-
sources. To be specific, a common-pool resource with very
limited growth ability cannot recover from a depleted situa-
tion even with the usage of tough punishment that can give
rise to the population cooperation.
(ii) Cooperations during a pandemic. The unprecedented
outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has caused great loss of
human life and the economic society. Moreover, the sup-
portive level that individuals are willing to take behavioral
actions (i.e., population cooperation) is of vital importance
for the final outcome of disease spreading [51–53]. Con-
versely, the prevalence of the virus also has strong impact
on individual decisions. This co-evolving loop can naturally
be described as an eco-evolutionary dynamics with disease-
based environmental feedback. Some inspirational works
that incorporate disease transmission models (SIS, SEIR)
into cooperation evolution and stress the effects of interac-
tions between disease spreading and social dynamics can be
obtained in [54,55].
Conclusions and prospects. – In summary, we have
provided a brief review of eco-evolutionary dynamics with
strategy-dependent environmental feedbacks, including the-
oretical frameworks from two-player games to public goods
game, the open problem of steering eco-evolutionary games
with external control laws and application cases of such
framework in different topics.
As stressed, the feedback-evolving game is certainly a
promising filed to investigate, as it characterizes the intricate
interplay of cooperation and environment in different scales
of coupled dynamical systems. In particular, we believe
three research directions will be of wide concern for inter-
disciplinary physics: (1) Theoretically, current works mainly
focus on classic two-player games or public goods game with
linear environmental feedbacks in well-mixed populations.
However, a more complete picture of the increasing com-
plexity arising from both the nonlinearity of coupled evolu-
tions and the structured interactions remains unclear. For
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instance, will the strategic and environmental outcomes be
qualitatively different in nonlinear PGG with nonlinear feed-
backs? What role will the complex network structures play
in mitigating social dilemma? The eco-evolutionary dynam-
ics in meta-population with heterogeneous environments is
also interesting for future exploration. Besides, many other
game types are also worth considering, such as the rock-
scissors-paper game, the ultimatum game and the stochastic
games [56,57]. (2) The control mechanism that can steer the
system to a desired state is of vital significance for solving
many social dilemmas. Nevertheless, as highlighted before,
this is still an open problem which demands further explo-
rations. Perhaps a potential way is to combine coevolution-
ary game theory with control theory. (3) Finally, the more
specific modelings that can be directly applied into diverse
fields are greatly needed, ranging from biology (feedback
loops in genomics [58]), public health (vaccine [51,52,59,60],
antibiotic use [61], co-evolutions of behavior-disease interac-
tions [54, 55, 62]), social science (coevolution of behavior-
belief systems [63, 64], sustaining cooperation in a polariz-
ing society [65–67], social dilemmas in online social networks
[68]), economics (how marketing environment changes, i.e.,
from bull to bear or from bear to bull, reshape the contracts
game between firms and employees [69]), to urgent global
issues (climate change [70], overexploitation of natural re-
sources [71]). The list could undoubtedly be much longer
and we just name a few. Further, the integration of model
and real data would be expected to provide more profound
insights.
The ongoing SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and the uncertainty
due to this pandemic remind us that we are actually living
in a world of constant change with many unpredictable acci-
dents. The eco-evolutionary game dynamics indeed provides
a valuable tool for understanding and predicting population
behaviors in such a changing world. While so many big
challenges still lie ahead, we believe sustained large-scale
cooperations is necessary for coping with these imminent
challenges [72].
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